The year is 2000. The Religious Institutions of the Future

A social worker, living in San Francisco, visits the Sokka Gakkai temple center in her neighborhood. Although a liberal Protestant by childhood training, and a rationalist by academic conditioning, she yearns for something different. The exotic atmosphere of the Temple, the repetition of simple formulas in a language she does not understand, and the aesthetic mystery of Buddha statues, incense, and colorful priests, is deeply comforting. She is a regular visitor.

A Jewish bride needs a place to get married. She quickly checks her yellow pages under Wedding Chapels and calls Schwartz’s. Mr. Schwartz owns the largest wedding chapel in the Miami area. He can run seven ceremonies with attached catering simultaneously. On his staff, in addition to chefs, receptionists and car attendants, are three full-time clergymen, who can adjust their ritual to the particular religious need of the customer. “Orthodox,” liberal, and mixed, can be easily accommodated with a richness of options no synagogue can. provide. The bride enjoys choosing one of seven possible outfits her clergy can wear.

A corporation engineer for General Motors has made his fourth move in ten years. He does not complain. Mobility is a universal way of life. But he and his family dread the initial isolation of a new place. They crave some sense of human community in a world of endless strangers and impersonal corporation directives. There is a Congregational church down the road from their apartment subdivision. It has a swimming pool, recreation programs for the children, and an intimate group of congenial people who are always engaged in lively discussion. The minister is friendly, empathic, and intellectual, and the whole church is like a big extended family. Although our engineer had some sort of vague Catholic background, he joins. After all, a church is a church.

The year is 1970.

We try to look into the future and imagine what religious institutions will become. Much speculation is the product of wishful thinking. It is the result of ‘projecting our deepest desires on to the canvass of succeeding years and seeing what we want to see, (whether a return to God or the triumph of humanism). Some speculation is the consequence of bad psychology. It misunderstands human need and conjures up institutions that nobody wants. Some prophecy emerges from bad sociology. It places too much emphasis on surveys – which reveal what people think they believe as opposed to surveys which describe what they do.

If our glimpse into the future is to be informative, we must clarify certain important distinctions.

We must distinguish between religion and religious institutions. It is quite conceivable that religious feelings, sacred rituals, and supernatural beliefs could exist in a society where there were no institutions designed specifically for their expression. It is quite conceivable that religious practices could be indulged without the presence of a professional clergy, uniquely trained for religious leadership. In a society where religion is unorganized, it may be very significant, even though almost invisible. But our inquiry has to do with the future of the religious institution – the church, the temple, and the full-time clergy.

We must also distinguish between what is intrinsically religious and what is historically religious. Intrinsic religion has to do with man’s attempt to come into contact with supernatural power, whether through worship or manipulation. It, specifically, has to do with the performance of ritual acts which are believed to have extra-powerful consequences – out of all
proportion to what one would naturally expect. The speech of prayer, the eating of consecrated wafers, the walking to shrines, the prostration of the body, are the kinds of actions which are normally designated as religious in most societies. If performed in the proper way, they are believed to guarantee supernatural results.

Historic religion, on the other hand, is what religious institutions do beyond what is intrinsically religious. Life-cycle celebrations, like puberty, marriage, and death, do not have to be religious. But in many societies they are. Since they are handled by religious institutions and supervised by the professional clergy, they become religious. There are hosts of social functions which churches and synagogues have performed in Western society which Eastern temples never assumed. Public welfare and public order were obsessions of Western churches. They were matters of indifference to the Eastern clergy. In fact, the significance of the Church in the history of the Western world is due to the tremendous number of non-religious roles it acquired.

The decline of the power of religious institutions in European society in the past two centuries is not only due to a crisis in belief or to a failure in credibility. It is also due to the fact that rival institutions have emerged which have taken over many of the social functions of the traditional churches. While it is true that the rise of science made the church vulnerable, it was only the presence of alternative professionals that made the transfer possible. Without the secular scientist the historic church would still be the best place for intellectual leadership.

A fair prognosis of the situation of religious institutions in America demands that we understand the social roles that churches (and synagogues) used to perform but no longer do perform.

Churches used to supply the grandeur a society requires. In many parts of the world today the church and the temple are the tallest and most impressive buildings in their environment. By their very size and magnificence they convey the image of authority. But the modern city has replaced them with the skyscraper, the university, and the public auditorium. Even ordinary schools and museums are grander and more luxurious than the buildings of most affluent churches. The church steeple no longer represents the ultimate in aspiration. Chicago’s John Hancock Building does.

Religious institutions used to provide the education in Western countries. Most schools and colleges were attached to churches, mosques, and shrines. Most were run by priests, mullahs, or rabbis. Education and the church were so inseparable that men of secular interest were compelled to become clergymen in order to pursue their vocations of teacher and scholar. The power of the church in a pre-urban society lay in the fact that men of learning were men of the church, regardless of their discipline. In China monks did not run ministries of finance and supervise armies. In Europe priests did. But times have changed. The major educational institutions in an industrial world are secular. They are independent of clergy domination. If the universities are not controlled by professionals who are hostile to churches, they are ‘certainly run by people who are indifferent. Even religion-owned colleges are becoming rapidly secularized. Those remaining under strict clerical control are regarded as the “dregs” of educational opportunity.

Churches were the historic providers of the poor. Hospitals, workhouses, and charity-boxes were started by the clergy, and controlled by them. The rich who wished to help the poor always gave their money to the church or to the mosque. The sick and the indigent always turned to the religious professional for their physical needs. Clergymen who sought to provide care and sustenance for the destitute were viewed as “in” their role. Social action, like the protection of the poor from usurious interest rates, may have been resisted, but was never denounced as “non-religious.” Only in our present age, when the government, political parties, and private corporations have assumed the burden of social welfare, has social action come to be defined as religiously inappropriate. And even for those who believe it is appropriate, there is the general feeling that political pressure for social reform is better handled by lawyers, businessmen, and labor organizers than by clergymen.

Art was the historic function of the church. Almost all great music, painting, and poetry were commissioned by religious institutions. In the middle ages the churches of Europe were the focal point of artistic endeavor. Their splendor was the result of the religious monopoly of aesthetic talent. But modern art has ignored the church. Modern painters,
sculptors, poets, and musicians create for secular audiences in secular settings. Museums and public buildings outshine the churches, and religious themes are peripheral. To be a great artist today does not need clerical endorsement.

Entertainment was a virtual monopoly of the sacred. The most exciting events in any community happened in the church or synagogue. The pageantry and color of the Roman mass, the shtiebel performance of the itinerant preacher, the annual processions for saints and martyrs, were the best stimulation around. The church provided the festivity and exaggeration without which the life of the common man would have been unendurable. But the religious institution of 1969 is hard put to compete with sports, theater, television, and night life. Preaching and ritual are pale against their rivals. They are usually only tolerable in small doses.

Escape from reality was a major service provided by the church. Since naked truth is too much for most men to bear continuously, and since most men require a certain amount of daily fantasy, there ‘lust be a place where people can imagine that their dreams are real. There must also be a place where they can act out with social approval all the anger and hostility which they are not allowed to express in their normal relations. Messiance visions of redemption for oneself and punishment for one’s enemies – with all the gory detail of vengeance – made the churches and synagogues superb therapy centers. The mythology of Judaism and Christianity, ritually enacted, were safe and fulfilling fantasies. But then came the secular theater, stadium sports, and the cinema. Four hours in a dark womb-like hall where a screen can realize any dream you can imagine, and where the unobserved viewer can safely purge any love or hate he needs to release, have made the churches second-rate fantasy dispensers.

Mass communication was a natural role for the religious institution to assume. Since the people used the church as a community center, the church was the best place to deliver news and announce decrees. An illiterate public dependent on the clergy for their relationship to authority and to the outside world, made the local temple their information depot. The rulers, in turn, found the church the most effective way for reaching the masses. However, the emergence of newspapers, radio, and television has provided secular alternatives for influencing the people which render the church irrelevant.

Ethnic loyalty was a decisive non-religious factor in the survival of churches in secular America. For countless immigrants, their church was the only way they possessed to affirm their cultural roots and to maintain their self-respect in the face of WASP contempt. To be truly Irish was to remain Catholic. To be truly Greek was to remain Orthodox. To be truly Jewish was to remain attached to a synagogue. Theology and ritual might be irrelevant, but loyalty to one’s ancestors was not. The churches and synagogues were havens for old-country languages and patriotic rallies, which would have appeared as non-respectable in any other setting. However, inter-group marriage and assimilation have wrought havoc with this extracurricular role. Certain groups, like the Jews and the Armenians, still feel enough outside hostility to require this support; but most others have graduated.

Ethical guidance was a dominant task for most Western religions. The clergy intervened to direct family, marriage, inheritance, trade, and patriotism. Moral behavior became inseparable from religious sanctions. Unlike Eastern shrines, which were havens of personal isolation, Western clergy were intent on molding society to their ethical vision. Supernatural power became the ally of a particular moral point of view; and the clergy enjoyed the role which forced them to pose as paragons of virtue. But, today, church and morality have a vestigial relationship. While, in most Western countries, religious endorsement of a particular ethical stand adds to its respectability, the public ‘suffers’ from the effects of a scientific age. It tends to ignore supernatural power, and to judge the rightness or wrong-ness of an action on the basis of its social consequences, which scientists can more easily perceive than clergymen.

So what remains?

There remain five human needs which religious institutions have historically fulfilled and which no other social institution can presently serve. These define the unique future of churches and synagogues.

There is the continuing need for irrational answers. It is not true that, in a scientific age, all educated people will become more rational. On the contrary, the complexity of life in an urban, mobile society makes reality too stimulating and too difficult. Advanced technology enhances a feeling of personal helplessness in the face of machinery that one can neither understand nor repair. Oppressive bureaucracies make the causes of problems seem more mysterious and their solutions seem more difficult. Convincing professionals, who appear to know of simple procedures for the handling of complex problems will be in continuing demand. The procedure may be prayer, the recitation of a ritual formula, meditation or yoga exercises. As long as the technique is easy to do, repetitive, and not intellectually taxing, it will be immensely attractive. In particular, exotic procedures that have not been tried before in the Western world and which still appear awesome, will enjoy increasing success. The human need they serve is the intrinsically religious one.

There is the continuing need for the illusion of permanence. In a world of rapid change, many people, even some who are generally quite rational, feel threatened by the absence of long-run stability. They yearn for the sight and sound of “eternal” things that appear indestructible. No institution is better geared to provide this illusion than the church or synagogue. The religious devotee can enter a building of colonial exterior or Gothic design and feel that time has stood still. He can listen to the old words of an old book which he does not really believe and watch old rituals which he does not really approve of, and derive immense satisfaction from the fact that they are old and enduring. Havens of permanence serve his desire.

There is the persistent need for the celebration of the life-cycle. All cultures make provision for the festivities of birth, puberty, and marriage, as well as the mourning of death. In Western countries these celebrations have been the monopoly of the clergy. In fact, they have become the major time-consuming function of the clergy. Interestingly, no rival secular professional has emerged to challenge this preserve. Non-religious people who seek to observe the high-points of their own life-cycle are forced to resort to the only life-cycle professionals available. The need is non-religious, but the institutional fulfilment is inevitably religious. Since no successful rivals are presently on the horizon, this monopoly seems assured for many years to come.

There is the important yearning for a sense of community. In an urban world where most people are strangers to each other and where most human relations are inevitably formal and perfunctory, there is the natural need for a community of friendship. A congregation which is small and intimate, and which serves as a substitute extended family for mobile people, will be in continuing demand. Since private clubs have too much the atmosphere of individual service, religious institutions will be the best available alternative. They have been performing this role ever since the emergence of the great cities.

There is the continuing need to find human support and fellowship when one’s own philosophy of life does not conform to the general consensus. People who have clearly thought out and articulated their values and truth procedures often find themselves at odds with the prevailing cliches. They do not like isolation. They seek out fellow-believers in order to strengthen their own self-esteem and to win converts. If their interest is not primarily political, and they provide life-cycle celebrations as well as community fellowship, they will end up as a religious organization. They will be religious in the sociological, if not in the intrinsic sense.

The consequence of these five needs is that five kinds of religious institutions will survive and be meaningful.

(1) Cultic chapel. There will be an increasing number of small chapels, run by individual clergymen, who have a ritualistic and non-intellectual response to modern problems. Attachment to the occult, astrology, Zen, and exotic procedures will have premium value. These chapels will not be run by congregations, but will be like Eastern shrines, supported by fees for individual service. They will cater to the increasing youthful interest in the mystical and irrational, and will be so structured as to allow patrons to indulge more than one

(2) Museum church. Old big churches will only survive by becoming shrine centers, in which the illusion of permanence is re-enforced. Their congregations twill be largely passive and non-participatory, and their membership will not initiate change. The periodic observance of traditional rituals will be reassuring and will attract small numbers of people who do not wish to be bothered with intimacy. New museum churches will be small but formal, emphasizing the value of ageless dignity.

(3) Life-cycle chapel. Enterprising clergymen and laymen will do to the wedding and puberty rites what funeral directors have already done for burial. They will remove them from the unnecessary context of the congregational structure and put them on the basis of personal ng service Om the manner of the lawyer and by physician). Already the multiple dining-room catering establishment is dominating American Jewish life. With attached clergymen, decorous chapels, and private tutoring, they can emerge as arch-rivals to the temple congregation. Their economic advantage is the absence of long-run commitment.

(4) Community church. Unless most large churches can successfully convert themselves into appealing museum centers, they will be unable to survive. New religious congregations whether Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, or exotic, will be small and intimate. In a bureaucratic and corporate world where theological differences will be insignificant, the better-educated masses will not want to join a church that is run like a corporation. They will insist on a religious home that gives them personal recognition and the opportunity of long-run friendships. The church role will be reversed. Simplicity will replace grandeur. Personality style will replace theological difference. Most churches and synagogues will be indistinguishable ideologically – but will be distinguished by the economic class and aesthetic interests they serve.

(5) Idea fellowship. There will be a small but increasing number of idea religious societies, which will articulate a non-conformist value-system or philosophy of life. The Quakers, the Christian Scientists, and the Humanists will be among these dissenters. They will be missionary in nature and more interested in training their members to express certain non- conformist values (e.g. pacifism, abstinence from medical treatment, world citizenship) than in just expressing the feeling of community.

The future of religious institutions in America is no idle speculation. It affects us intimately. The future of the Birmingham Temple is tied up with the future of human need and the satisfactions it demands.